Top boy: cultural verisimilitude and the allure of Black criminality for UK public service broadcasting drama by Malik, Sarita & Nwonka, Clive James
  
Sarita Malik and Clive James Nwonka 
Top boy: cultural verisimilitude and the 
allure of Black criminality for UK public 
service broadcasting drama 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
Original citation: 
Malik, Sarita and Nwonka, Clive James (2017) Top boy: cultural verisimilitude and the allure of 
Black criminality for UK public service broadcasting drama. Journal of British Cinema and 
Television, 14 (4). pp. 423-444. ISSN 1743-4521 
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.2017.0387 
 
© 2017 Edinburgh University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/91311 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: December 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
Top Boy: Cultural Verisimilitude and the
Allure of Black Criminality for UK
Public Service Broadcasting Drama
Sarita Malik and Clive James Nwonka
Abstract:
In the early 2000s, a new form of multicultural television drama began to
emerge in the UK, exploring contemporary gang life within Britain’s black
communities. A notable example of this ‘black urban crime’ genre is Top
Boy, screened by the UK’s leading multicultural public service broadcaster,
Channel 4, in 2011 and 2013. This article produces an analysis, drawing
on sociological and media studies perspectives, and through historicisation
and contextualisation, that seeks to understand the fascination of the black
urban crime genre for programme-makers, broadcasters and audiences in
the contemporary British mediascape. It locates Top Boy at the intersection
of complex media relations and modes of production that are themselves
intertwined with political, legislative and cultural agendas tied to post-
multiculturalist and neoliberal tendencies within public service broadcasting
frameworks. The article suggests that black urban crime narratives do not
advance understandings of the organisational structure of urban gangs or
drug-related crime that are so central to these texts, nor do they offer a
progressive contribution to contemporary debates or the representation of
black criminality.
Keywords: black; Channel 4; crime drama; multiculturalism; post-multi-
culturalism; public service broadcasting; urban; youth.
Introduction
The rise of the urban, multicultural television drama in the
2000s represents a critical shift in the media’s representations of
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black communities. The trend is exemplified by a recent surge of
programmes preoccupied with the notion of a black ‘underclass’,
locked in by criminality, social disadvantage and a localised drugs
trade; these are notably situated within a social realist framework.
This article offers a critical examination of the rise of the black urban
crime narrative in the context of public service broadcasting (PSB) in
the United Kingdom and analyses the manifold motivations for its
production in contemporary cultural and political contexts. The article
considers the political milieu within which the genre has emerged
and suggests that the New Labour governments’ conceptualisation of
both multiculturalism and ‘urban’ criminality within their neoliberal
agenda in the 1990s and early 2000s influenced the particular nuance
inscribed in this latest ‘authentic’ cultural representation of black
criminality. We will draw on the example of the two critically acclaimed
social realist series, Top Boy, screened on Channel 4 in 2011 and 2013.
For researchers within and beyond television studies, Top Boy presents
a powerful example of how traditional mainstream media (including
media that is framed through the lens of public service) continues to
produce and reaffirm normative cultural meanings around ‘race’ and
criminality in contemporary contexts.
We propose that the mainstream media and state agents play a key
role in instituting representations of black criminality and, specifically,
the contemporary ‘black gang, gun and knife crime’ consensus. Along
with an analysis of the series’ textual features, a fundamental aspect
of this discussion is Top Boy’s production context: the circumstances in
which ‘black urban crime drama’ is itself conceptualised and produced
within a television apparatus that is subject to and constituted by
market and cultural influences that, in turn, help to shape the
text’s final form and meaning. This also involves acknowledging the
legislative changes in the 1990s that led to an abatement of ethnic
minority production in PSB in the UK, specifically with regard to
ideas of (post) multiculturalism and how Channel 4 responded to this.
The effects of these various influences are discussed in relation to a
rearticulated multicultural social realist dramatic form that is centred
on notions of the urban linked to the social constructions of ‘blackness’,
crime and masculinity. We are particularly interested in the cultural
dynamics that produce the racialised meanings associated with certain
kinds of crime in these salient, current contexts.
Our analysis is divided into three interwoven sections with
overlapping concerns that are addressed through historicisation and
contextualisation. Firstly, we explore the wider agenda of the Channel
4/neoliberal politics embrace. Second, we consider media culture and
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notions of cultural verisimilitude and the ways in which the black urban
crime narrative articulates the depoliticisation and utilisation of the
concept of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) in media culture.
And third, through an analysis of Top Boy, we consider the generic
manoeuvres of social realism as a tool through which to represent black
criminality to wider publics.
Channel 4, New Labour, and the allure of the black
urban crime narrative
UK television’s relationship with its ethnic minority population came
to fruition with the advent of Channel 4 in 1982, with programming
devised specifically for black and ethnic minority audiences emerging
as a direct result of the Annan Report’s recommendations for the
fourth channel to cater for the interests of minority audiences as
part of a wider commitment to PSB. The 1981 Broadcasting Act
gave the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) responsibility for
establishing Channel 4 and decreed several programming obligations
that the channel would need to fulfil in order to demonstrate its
particular PSB remit. Most notably, they were required to ‘ensure that
the programmes contain a suitable proportion of matter calculated
to appeal to tastes and interests not generally catered for by ITV’.
This was of particular importance in the 1980s, considering existing
racial tensions within British society, with Lord Scarman’s report into
the 1981 Brixton riots acting as the genesis for a ‘comprehensive,
grounded political programme of accommodating cultural minority
needs’ (Vinen, 2010: 90).
These macro developments emerged at the same time as ideas
emanating from sociologists and cultural studies scholars such as
Stuart Hall (1981), Paul Gilroy (1987) and John Solomos (1988)
who advanced arguments that media representations of black
youths were not only complicit in demonising and ‘othering’ them
but that such approaches had significantly impacted upon the
discriminatory experiences of black men within the British judicial
system. Early attempts to formulate a sociological understanding of
media representations of black British youths generally took a critical
approach to the practices of institutional power, and Hall et al.’s
Policing the Crisis (1978) stands out as the seminal text providing
an analysis of the British state, authoritarian populism and the
turn to market solutions. Hall’s work in particular is important for
highlighting how the specific cultural contexts (television, film and
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print media) in which the construction of hegemony takes place are
often heavily racialised through the use of racial stereotyping, which
in turn works to create a consensus around the issue of black youths
and crime.
The socio-political climate of the early 1980s supported the
implementation of certain government initiatives that eventually led to
the establishment of Channel 4 in 1982. The challenge to hegemonic
narratives of race and blackness was most dramatically expressed in
films of the black film and video independent workshop collectives
that emerged in the mid-1980s such as the Black Audio Film Collective,
Ceddo and Sankofa, with the sustained support of Channel 4 proving
favourable for film-makers wishing to use screen media to produce
visual counter-narratives to the prevailing hegemony (Mercer 1987).
Many of these films were given a platform on the newly established
Channel 4 and these investigated the discrimination, social exclusion
and stigmas that defined everyday modes of existence for Britain’s
black communities at the time, and they did so in ways antithetical
to British television’s previous role as a largely consensus-producing
vehicle for racial stereotyping. Notably, documentaries such as Ceddo’s
The People’s Account (1985), which investigated the Broadwater Farm
riots from the perspective of the communities involved, revealed ‘the
antagonistic relationship between the police and the residents and how
the media colluded with the police in distorting the real causes of the
uprising’ (Friedman 1993: 131). Such films were defined by Kobena
Mercer (1994: 239) as dialogical, in that they offered a counter-
hegemonic response to racist stereotypes, engaging with the lived
politics of racism and representation in a way that produced a ‘critical
dialogue’. Many of the issues addressed by early Channel 4 with regard
to black television production – the ontology of multiculturalism, the
question of television as social practice, and issues of narrative
choice and authorship – fed into ideas being explored by scholars
and cultural theorists of the time, in particular questions of televisual
representation and television’s socio-cultural significance as a form of
expression (Fiske 1987; Williams 1977).
However, the neoliberal model of PSB that began its ascendancy as a
result of the 1990 Broadcasting Act and has deepened over the past two
decades comprised an array of changes at the level of commissioning,
production and content. As far as Channel 4 was concerned, these
changes included a shift from a radical television culture as an outlet
for minority viewpoints toward the commissioning of programming
targeted at the (assumed) tastes and interests of mainstream British
audiences. UK writers who have explored the introduction and
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representational consequences of this shift of remit include Brown
(2007) and Hobson (2007). The socio-political influences that imbued
a redefinition of multicultural representation and the sidelining of
black content providers were the consequence of an increasingly
competitive marketplace that undermined many of the values of
Channel 4’s original remit (Malik 2013). This was also part of a broader
turn, which had been developing since the start of the millennium,
in which serious challenges to multicultural policies and institutional
frameworks were being posed (Vertovec 2010). For PSB, this meant a
discursive orientation away from those discrimination, inequality and
social justice concerns so apparent in early Channel 4 and towards a
broad conception of ‘individuality’, coupled with the arguments of the
market state, as licensed by this new politics of post-multiculturalism
(Malik 2013). Simultaneously, an emphasis on modernisation and
change lay at the heart of the new self-identity advanced by the
New Labour governments that were elected in 1997, 2001 and 2005.
The scope of this modernisation included a pervasive discourse of
inclusivity, particularly aimed at young black people in the aftermath
of the 1999 Macpherson Report which followed the racially motivated
murder of the black British teenager, Stephen Lawrence, in South
London in 1993.
Meanwhile, changes in urban subculture included the popularising
of black cultural products, such as UK Garage and Grime music, the
commercialisation of ‘urban clothing’ and the prevalence of young
black people in mainstream media. Such a commodification of black
subculture served the social inclusion agenda well and was aimed
at an emerging black British generation distanced from the racial
politics of the 1980s and early 1990s. It marked a new modality
of multicultural discourse predicated on an enthusiasm for cultural
difference or ‘cultural diversity’. Thus ‘urban’ initially acted as a
commercial pseudonym that by the early 2000s was offering the
illusion of inclusivity through the ‘positive’ mainstreaming of black
youth subculture. Coinciding with these various developments was an
additional social policy consequence that, paradoxically, was useful for
the twin agendas of both New Labour and Channel 4 in fulfilling a
market agenda while simultaneously carrying out their public-facing
responsibilities. This involved a new connotation of ‘urban’. A spate of
knife and gun crimes among sections of black working-class youths
in areas across London in the early 2000s revived issues of black
alienation in the public consciousness. ‘Black on black’ and ‘postcode
shootings’ became interchangeable terms used frequently in popular
discourse to describe territorial conflicts between young people from
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particular districts of London, contributing to a language in the mass
media which developed a self-serving prophecy of black crime. For
example, a piece in the Observer, 21 September 2003, headed ‘Without
a Gun, You’re Dead’, offered a sensationalised account of the influence
of ‘original Yardies’ who are ‘being challenged by gangs of British-born
black people who have proved themselves to be capable of just as much
violence’.
The journalistic appetite for the term ‘gangs’ and the euphemisms
associated with gangs (‘young black men’ and ‘urban’), went on to elicit
both interest and fear among British publics towards certain cultural
‘others’. The ‘gangland Britain thesis’ (Hallsworth and Young 2008:
182), based around an apparent rise in ‘urban street-based’ gangs, has
been heavily contested within cultural criminology. The idea of a ‘gang
epidemic’ has been critiqued on the grounds that it reflects tendencies
within the media to sensationalise rather than provide evidence of
the empirical realities of criminal activity. In addition, within the
academic literature there is a strong critique of the ideological basis
of ‘gang problem’ discourse in that it locates certain heavily racialised
communities as a ‘suitable enemy’ (Christie 2001).
Sensationalist headlines such as ‘Gun Crime Spreads “Like a
Cancer’’ across Britain’ (Observer, 5 October 2003), ‘The Ethnic
Connection’ (Observer, 25 May 2003), ‘They’ll Shoot Anyone –Even
the Police’ (Guardian, 25 May 2003) and ‘Homegrown Gangs Shoot to
Power on Our Violent Streets’ (Observer, 26 August 2001) combined to
advance a culture of anxiety about young, black working-class men in
Britain. Within these official discourses, we can identify a tendency to
define urban crime as gang-related, a process by which black criminals
become ‘Yardie gangs’. As suggested by Van Duyne (2003), both the
media and police regularly express concern over aspects of criminality
that are yet to be significantly addressed by academic research but
are routinely narrated as ‘organised crime’. This context has given an
added impetus to the alluring rise of the black urban crime narrative,
despite the actually relatively fluid organisational structure of such
criminal activity. Ethnicised accounts became the basis for a concerted
effort by the press to establish the black gangs discourse and further
catalysed media interest in black, urban youth criminality. This mode
of racialised discourse also neglected analytical readings of crime as
an outcome of problematic socio-economic structures or institutional
power (Metcalf 2012). Since these crimes appeared to be concentrated
within inner-city estates and committed by black people against black
people, mainstream media culture combined to pathologise gun crime
as emanating solely from within Britain’s black community, and to
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represent urban violence as intra-racial and thus a problem created
by and within black society.
The work of Jewkes (2004) and Best (1995) has analysed the
influence of media moral sensationalism on public discourse and
opinion, underlining the potential dangers of such coverage in
reaffirming cultural stereotypes and stigmas. Within the media, ‘urban’
became ‘a powerful and recognizable “brand’’’ to ‘be pinned to alleged
ethnic crime’ (Hobbs 2006: 428). This new negative inflection of
‘urban’ (and its various hyphenated forms) reinforced notions of a
black ‘underclass’ laying their own lives to waste, a decontextualised
interpretation that consequently strengthened hegemonic narratives
of black criminality. As McKenzie (2015: 198) argues, such culturalist
discourses suggest that it is black people’s ‘self-destructive behaviour,
through their own practices, tastes, what they wear, how they speak and
who they decide to share their beds with that begins to represent a real
threat to British values and national life’. Notions of cultural difference
have been central to how both the police and mainstream media have
defined gang culture and gun and urban crime in general.
A social consequence of such practices was the way in which black
communities were deemed to require a particular form of policing.
As such, and as has been discussed in other research around the
link between black criminal typification and effects on policy (Welch
2007), the black urban crime narrative provided a rationale for
policy directions and practical implementation, including initiatives
such as racial profiling. Following the 1999 Lawrence Inquiry, the
Metropolitan Police established Operation Trident in 2000 with the
sole aim of investigating crime within London’s black communities.
This racialising of crime represented the further neoliberalisation
of British social life; it seemed to suggest that the police regarded
‘black on black’ violence as a separate and quite specific mode of
criminality. Thus, in the case of Operation Trident, we see that the
state apparatus’s response to urban criminality takes on the form of an
ideological mode of policing, with mainstream media and state agents
playing a key role in instituting the ‘black gang, gun and knife crime’
consensus.
Cultural verisimilitude, screen media and the black crime discourse
Film and televisual representations form a key role in helping to
produce this discursive culture, with media repetition of black gang
crime anecdotes producing a particular modality of racialised moral
hysteria. The proliferation of the urban crime narrative prompted a
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number of British film-makers, inspired by the media discourses of
the time, to engage with themes of black crime in their productions,
and gave rise to a new contemporary subgenre in British film and
television: the black (youth-orientated) urban crime drama. Two
interrelated theories of genre – generic and cultural verisimilitude – are
important when we start to explore how this genre reproduces
dominant discourses of black criminality. For Steve Neale (2000),
in his development of the concept of verisimilitude in theorising
the narrative forms of cinema, film genres consist not only of
expectations of the text, but also expectations of audiences. Such
expectations (character, narrative, location) are cultivated through
regimes of verisimilitude. Neale divides verisimilitude into two
(sometimes hybridised) approaches: while generic verisimilitude refers
to the established conventions of a genre to which the text must adhere,
cultural (or social) verisimilitude pertains to the dominant ideological
discourse, in that it adheres to what is believed to be a true reflection
of its subject matter. Crucially, as Tzvetan Todorov (1981) has asserted,
this does not suggest that cultural verisimilitude represents a fidelity to
socio/cultural/political truths, but rather that it corresponds to popular
expectations and discourses purporting to be true.
We can locate specifically both the generic and cultural regimes of
verisimilitude that helped to produce the black urban crime drama on
screen. The highly-acclaimed BBC drama Storm Damage (2000) marked
an early demonstration of mainstream broadcasters tapping into
gangsterism among Britain’s BAME youths. The BBC Films/UKFC
production Bullet Boy (2005) was released at the apex of the intensive
media focus on gun crime and possesses narrative themes that have
previously been defined as anti-national national cinema (Wayne
2002). Described by Philip French in the Observer, 10 April 2015, as
a film that ‘takes an unflinching look at the choices faced by young
black men in today’s Britain’, the production appeared to possess all
the hallmarks of a film which, according to Mike Wayne, displays an
‘acute attunement to the specific social, political and cultural dynamics
within the territory of the nation’ (2002: 45). Given the dearth of black
British film production and the UKFC’s rhetoric of cultural diversity
(the new mode of addressing ethnic diversity in a post-multiculturalist
landscape), Bullet Boy was a critical triumph within liberal quarters
and hailed as a milestone in realistic portrayals of Britain’s inner-city
‘underclass’. A number of films that purported to deal with issues of
black crime and gang subculture in London followed, presented via
various themes such as the underground music scene in Life and Lyrics
(2006), youth delinquency in Kidulthood (2005), the drugs trade in
430
Cultural Verisimilitude and Black Criminality
Rollin’ with the Nines (2008), 1 Day (2009) and Shank (2010). This trend
was also being replicated in television, with Kudos Film & Television
developing West 10 LDN (BBC3, 2008) and Dubplate Drama (Channel
4, 2005–9). While sharing some of the thematic concerns of Bullet Boy,
the most successful of these films was Adulthood (2008), which acted as
a prototype for this production trend, its contemporary urban milieu
and its thematic and narrative conventions demonstrating the genre’s
considerable commercial potential.
What was clear was that the urban crime narrative had accumulated
a deep resonance in the public consciousness and was now a preferred
genre for financial investment within the publicly funded cultural
sector, often framed through media institutions’ strategic purposes
around cultural diversity: Adulthood, for example, was one of the top
twenty British films of 2008. The sociological interest in this topic
for producers and film-makers lay partly in the fact that it indicated
a new form of social identity. Both Bullet Boy and Adulthood had
the potential to provide an urgent visual encounter with the lived
realities of urban crime, offering a counter-hegemonic account of
gun crime in the context of wider socio-economic considerations.
However, their decontextualised accounts reflected a broader media
discourse by rejecting the idea that urban crime is constructed by
socio-economic inequality and racial discrimination. Instead, the focus
was on how urban youths actively marginalised themselves from wider
society in an anti-social ‘underclass’ deliberately pursuing a subculture
of criminality. This, of course, also chimed with the New Labour claim
that knife and gun murders in London were not the outcome of a
defective socio-economic structure but of a distinctive incubus within
black culture. As Tony Blair put it when Prime Minister:
Economic inequality is a factor and we should deal with that, but I don’t
think it’s the thing that is producing the most violent expression of this
social alienation . . . I think that is to do with the fact that particular
youngsters are being brought up in a setting that has no rules, no
discipline, no proper framework around them. (Quoted in the Guardian,
12 April 2007)
This rhetoric barely conceals the anxiety at the heart of the black
youth crime discourse, and Blair’s assessment of social alienation as a
cultural outcome as opposed to a socio-political process was consistent
with both broad public opinion and media representations. In this
context, media reactions to urban crime were framed, we want to
suggest, not by social inequality concerns but, rather, by concepts of
how the black ‘underclass’ had created immoral communities. The
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various expectations, modalities and indexes of urban crime dramas
are particularly germane in the case of Channel 4’s Top Boy because of
the explicitly social realist framework through which it operated.
Top Boy and the manoeuvres of social realism
At the peak of gang-related crime in the 2000s, media interest
in representations of ‘black crime’ was perceived as inevitable and
mimetic. Indeed, the cultural concern within this discussion is not to
dispute the validity of mainstreammedia representations of criminality
among young black men. Rather, it is with how mainstream media
discourses, framings and constructions of ‘race’ often work in relation
to politically expedient circumstances. Moreover, it is with the specific
allure of television drama as a method of social engagement in
relation to ideas of ‘black urban crime’. For Ellis, television ‘acts
as our forum for interpretations of the world’ (1999: 69), therefore
television drama possesses certain epistemological properties and,
within a PBS paradigm, provides a common frame of reference for
the construction of identities. Bignell et al. suggest that ‘at its best,
television drama has provided not only a window to the world but also
a critical interrogation of it’ (2000: 1). This is important because, when
situating television drama within didactic contexts, socio-political
epistemologies can emerge to counter hegemonic narratives located
within the national sphere.
However, this only partially describes the issue, since practitioners
are also influenced by, and operate within, wider media structures and
political discourses. With regard to the black urban crime narrative,
we can start to map the credentials of the genre in the 2000s in
a way that also relates to notions of dramatic licence and realism.
The term ‘urban’, for example, possesses an articulation beyond
ethnicity and social position, and this is the idea of crossover. While
the term ‘black’ had once ‘functioned as a political category to unify
people of colour in the face of white racism’ (Wayne 2002: 122),
with the evacuation of political enquiry post-multiculturalist television
in this guise could be assimilated, categorised, instrumentalised and
commercialised. Thus in terms of audience crossover, the black British
urban drama genre functioned, in part, as a welcome (for some)
departure from the polarised production culture of the 1980s, which
had interrogated the social, political and economic marginalities of
black Britain (for example, on early Channel 4). The new modality of
black drama can therefore be understood not just in relation to a later,
post-multiculturalist Channel 4, but also in relation to questions
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of class, audience and market share, providing a narrative solution
congruent with the way in which the middle classes and the liberal
broadsheet press were able to imagine and pathologise black urban
youths in relation to narratives of crime.
Channel 4’s Top Boy exemplifies much of what is being described
here, because it dramatises the hegemonic cultural idiolects which
mainstream media advocate as being intrinsic to black working-class
life. This form of representation can be considered in relation to a
desire for a new kind of multicultural drama in pulling together many
of the issues central to popular discourses in urban culture: deprived
social housing, the temptations of violence, gangs and drugs, single-
parent families, neglected/misguided children and misplaced loyalties.
The catalyst for the development of Top Boy came about after Ronan
Bennett, the series creator and screenwriter, observed a twelve-year-
old orchestrating a drugs transaction in a supermarket car park in
Hackney. The idea was later developed with Charles Steel and Alasdair
Flind of Cowboy Films, under the supervision of Channel 4 producers
Camilla Campbell and Robert Wulff-Cochrane. In a one-off open call,
the casting team specifically sought BAME individuals between the
ages of thirteen and sixteen, with previous acting experience not
required. This form of ‘street casting’ was married with workshop
techniques with a young ensemble cast: a vital strategy for achieving
cultural impact among young BAME viewers by rendering ‘credible’
their lifestyles, behavioural characteristics and vernacular and for
producing a representation of ‘authenticity’ on screen. As observed by
Nosheen Iqbal in the Guardian, 9 August 2013:
Much was made of Top Boy’s tower-block authenticity, but timing, too,
had its part to play; the first series arrived, serendipitously, soon after
the 2011 London riots, and gave an honest account of inner-city life for
young people with no jobs, no prospects and no power beyond their own
postcode. It was neither patronising or try-hard – the usual twin criticisms
of self-defining gritty urban dramas – and it cast kids from the estates
over professional actors, which helped to give the show its bleak realism.
This commentary goes beyond the cultural verisimilitude we have been
discussing. Here, interplay is established between the intentions of the
critic, the text in question and the beliefs held by its readership. Iqbal
attempts to locate Top Boy on a sociological terrain by summarising
the content, hegemonic assumptions and narrative themes specific
to the drama as part of a broader gambit of stimulating audience
expectation through a system of generic images, subjecting Top Boy
to an array of labels, terms and euphemisms in order to establish a
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‘generic corpus’ (Neale 2000) that defines urban drama as a spectacle.
Yet such generic language has the power to reinforce, rather than
ameliorate, black youth crime-related stigma. By making a correlation
between the 2011 London riots and Top Boy’s social realism, terms
such as ‘inner-city life’ reinforce dominant characterisations about the
nature of ‘blackness’ and, indeed, its pervasive associations with ‘gang
culture’. As pointed out by Reading the Riots (Guardian/LSE 2011),
which examines the causes and consequences of the 2011 London
riots, the role of gangs in the riots was, in fact, minimal. It is evident,
then, that Iqbal legitimises, through her emphasis on Top Boy’s ‘honest
account’, the hegemonic assumptions about both the cause of and
participants in urban criminality. According to the liberal press, the
non-professional cast was perfectly suited to the roles; not only did they
reproduce the generic images held in the public consciousness and
were able to provide an authentic vernacular, but the actor’s real-life
backstory (Ashley Walters, the lead actor, had served a prison sentence
for possession of a firearm) re-emphasises the generic verisimilitude of
the drama.
The journalistic reviews thus promise authenticity and realism,
and the actual representational strategy employed by Top Boy
is related to critical questions of realism and generic/cultural
verisimilitude. However, in order for the drama to be categorised
as realist, it must contain certain generically verisimilar textual
features. The production relied on the film-makers shooting
on location with non-professional actors in order to emphasise
the authenticity of Hackney’s social milieu. However, culturally
verisimilitudinous elements cannot be achieved without audience
awareness and prior knowledge. Therefore the correspondence
between the authenticity of the drama and public expectations
have to be reinforced, as evidenced by Channel 4’s press release.
Here, sensationalist description provides a fundamental element
in establishing the drama’s narrative image, and ‘an honest and
gripping rendition of inner-city drug and gang culture’ (Channel 4,
2011) anchors Top Boy in the generic imagery suited to its narrative
intentions. This marketing approach allowed the drama to establish
the generic corpus in a manner designed to attract its intended
audience. To enhance the verisimilitude of the text, Bennett, who had
lived in Hackney for more than 25 years, employed an ethnographic
development technique for Top Boy, immersing himself for two years
in the local drugs trade and maximising the use of testimony from
drug dealers, schoolchildren, social workers and local residents in
order to insert a particular authenticity into its narrative concerns
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and dialogue. In explaining the distillation of these interviews into
dramatic storytelling, Bennett stated in an article in the Observer,
9 October 2011:
I do what dramatists do – throw it all into the mix, stir it around and
wait to see what characters and storylines emerge. There’s not room for
everything, and certain of my own preoccupations will always come to
the fore: the struggles of disadvantaged kids; the absent father; the man
who helps without being pious.
Here, the recurrent discourse on factuality and generic verisimilitude
in relation to a purportedly realist black drama invokes a voyeuristic
anticipation, feeding into what Jauss (1982: 79) has termed the
‘horizon of expectation’, a unity between the drama’s content and an
audience already familiar with both its generic corpus and associated
media discourses. Here again, authenticity is guaranteed by the
anthropological work of the practitioner. The feature reports on the
extent of the ethnography required for the drama’s development: a
classic ‘research agenda’ is advanced not only to ensure its cultural
verisimilitude but also to respond to the perpetual questions of fidelity
of representation that arise, particularly in the context of ethnic
minority representation in PSB. Ahead of its filming, the production
drew criticism as a result of its sensationalised narrative, with the
shooting location moving to Brixton when filming permission was
refused by Hackney Council for the first series in 2011, with Hackney’s
Mayor quoted in the Hackney Citizen, 23 September 2011, to the
effect that ‘it was not fair on residents to run the risk of having
their neighbourhood stigmatised on national television as riddled with
drugs and gangs . . . What possible justification could the Council give
for being complicit in such negative stereotyping?’
Although this controversy over the drama created temporary
logistical problems for its production, it generated a specific
public/media interest in and expectations about the drama. In
his analysis of film industry promotional practices, Ellis (1981)
identifies the construction of a ‘narrative image’ that emerges from
a combination of film industry publicity material and the discourses of
mainstream media that have become internalised within the fabric of
public consciousness. Both cultural and generic verisimilitude perform
a defining role in producing the realist expectations evident in the
publicity for the drama. We can look, for example, at the visual
aesthetic of Top Boy’s promotional poster. Against the backdrop of twin
high-rise tower blocks, the three principle characters stand, in a parody
of an Olympic podium, on a damaged BMW, a dustbin, and a low-rise
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brick wall surrounded by rubbish bins. The hierarchy established by
the varying positions of its characters visually foretells the antagonistic
relationship that materialises in the series. The promotional materials
promise portrayals of alienated black youths, authentic locations,
contemporary street apparel and urban settings. Further, the copy
teases audiences with ‘an incredible 4 nights of drama’ suggesting not
simply a new drama on the Channel, but a media event. Such an array
of signifying practices combines to produce a strong idea of Top Boy’s
visual, aural and narrative authenticity. In addition, youth advertising
agency Livity effectively maximised the use of social media as a form
of promotion and engagement targeted at what Channel 4 identified
as ‘hard to reach audiences’. Top Boy achieved over one million On
Demand views online and 123,000 tweets during the week in which
it was broadcast, becoming the most tweeted Channel 4 programme
since the Channel began analysing social media interaction. Further,
there were over 23,000 plays of the drama’s soundtrack. At the impact
level, as well as its one million-plus viewership, positive reviews and
requests by schools across London for educational film screenings, the
series also achieved critical acclaim, winning a Broadcast Award for
Best Drama Series.
These frames of production and interpretation are important
in how we understand the linkages between crime, media and
culture. Considering the effect of ideological ‘codes’ on televisual
communication, Hall states ‘they refer signs to the “maps of meaning’’
into which any culture is classified; and those “maps of social reality’’
have the whole range of social meanings, practices and usages, power
and interest “written in’’ to them’ (1980: 57). How do these codes
produce meanings of the social groups represented in Top Boy? How
is ‘crime’ understood in these community contexts and what does this
tell us about changing discourses of multiculturalism? The drama itself
centres on 26-year-old drug dealer and gang leader Dushane (Ashley
Walters) and his ambition to rise to the apex of the East London
drugs business, assisted by his friend Sully (Kane Robinson). The
linear, cause-and-effect narrative takes the spectator through a number
of dramatic set pieces – primarily, the violent acts committed by
Dushane and Sully in their efforts to monopolise East London’s drugs
trade. The emotional heart of the drama lies with Ra’Nell (Malcolm
Kamulete), a thirteen-year-old fending for himself in the absence of
his mentally ill mother Lisa (Sharon Duncan Brewster). Ra’Nell’s best
friend Gem (Giacomo Mancini) is enticed into Dushane’s drugs cartel
while pregnant Heather (Kierston Wareing) enrolls Ra’Nell into her
cannabis-growing scheme to raise the deposit that will help her to
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move off the estate. Tellingly, in a panel of local youths assembled
by the Observer to critique the show, Heather emerged as ‘the most
virulently disliked by our panel. Not because she is white, maybe
because she is middle-class, but definitely because she wants to get out’,
as the paper reported on 30 October 2011. As the relationship between
her and Ra’Nell develops, we get the sense that Heather possesses a
very basic desire, a dream of a middle-class home-life that contrasts
with the urban ‘ghetto’ environment that so appals her. By setting up
this basic aspirational contrast, the drama achieves a binary sympathy
for the young of Hackney and hostility towards Dushane and Sully, who
desire only profit from and dominance over others, and at any cost.
These storylines are condensed in interwoven narrative structures
that attempt to demonstrate how the drugs trade (in a localised
context) impacts the lives of the residents on the fictional
Summerhouse Estate. This is also why Top Boy is an ensemble drama,
with many of its characters of equal narrative significance. Visually, the
directors Yann Demange (series 1) and Jonathan van Tulleken (series 2)
attempt a social realist treatment of the milieu of disenfranchised black
British youths. Both directors display a keen eye for detail and careful
composition and there is a definite realist approach to the way they
frame Hackney: sequence shooting and deep-focus cinematography,
with a fidelity to real-time. The natural lighting and the hand-held
camera and cinéma vérité style employed to generate a feeling of
spontaneity are all used to marry cast and location together and give
the impression that the fictional situations emerge spontaneously from
the real social context.
The opening images of Top Boy’s first episode consist of establishing
shots of East London tower blocks, hand-held images of black youths
loitering against a car, our protagonists supervising a drugs deal while
members of their crew are robbed at gunpoint by a rival all-black drugs
gang to the soundtrack of urban music. This is observed from afar by
an isolated and impressionable Ra’Nell. This sequence, which all takes
place within three minutes, offers an indication of the representational
strategy central to Top Boy. The geographical specificity of the show
(a young boy is sent by Dushane to spy on a gang in London Fields)
invites a literal representation of Hackney modelled on working-class
housing estates. Top Boy frames crime as a means of social mobility
and greed is central to the text, as indicated in the series’ title. In this
way, Top Boy is about capitalism, the violent accumulation of wealth
and its tragic consequences. Tellingly, one of the duo’s first acts after
being given control of the Summerhouse Estate by drugs lord Bobby
(Geoff Bell) is to sever the fingers of a rival criminal with a wire cutter,
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followed by a series of violent reprisal attacks on various members
of Hackney’s underworld. Successively, Dushane and Sully set alight
a relative of a rival and shoot dead Bobby’s right-hand man Lee (Cirus
Desir). Here, Dushane and Sully are crafted as anti-heroes, modern
gangsters, and the drama has begun its critical turn away from social
analysis and into a culturally verisimilitudinous urban spectacle.
As an unsurprising consequence, there is little interaction between
Bennett’s characters and wider social authorities such as schools, and
a striking limit to the social realist ideals in Top Boy is its exclusion
of state institutions. In Top Boy’s second series, broadcast in four
one-hour shows in November 2013, there is a concerted attempt by
Bennett to expand both the thematic concerns and the nuances of
Hackney’s criminal world. The most obvious change is the appearance
of state authority, with the police featuring more prominently as
an antagonistic institution, and several instances of stop-and-search
appear to suggest that the writer is tapping into high-profile issues
in the public domain, with a greater willingness to display a more
realistic relationship between the characters and the state apparatus.
However, the presentation of the police in Top Boy does not offer a
convincing critique of institutional racism towards young black males.
Rather, there are small asides, such as the casual comment by Dusane
to the effect that his detainment by police on a murder enquiry was
‘a harassment ting’. In such a fashion, Top Boy embodies its evasion of
actual social criticism. This casual narrative injection entails no real
attempt to analyse the ‘real’ relationship between black youths and
the criminal justice system, and the series does not engage critically
with actual conflicts between the Metropolitan Police and the BAME
community.
The increase in non-black characters offers a visual sense of an
integrated Hackney. While this may be an attempt to interrupt
hegemonic televisual representations of urban crime as a black
idiolect, one of the virtues of the show is that the characters are
not easily homogenised. Furthermore, while stereotypical instances of
single-parent families are frequent in series 1, fatherhood becomes
a continuing narrative thread in this second outing. The paternal
instincts that both Dris (Shone Romulus) and Sully show to their
children create characters who are more three-dimensional and
demonstrate that the relationship between the elders and youngsters
on the estate is not determined solely by the latters’ practical use
as drugs runners. However, Stuart Hall problematised what can be
identified as the ‘positive/negative strategy’ at work here, suggesting
that even the presence of positive images amid the ‘largely negative
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repertoire of the dominant regime of representation . . . does not
necessarily displace the negative. Since the binaries remain in place,
meaning continues to be framed by them’ (2001: 274). In other words,
such narrative strategies do not recast being a young black male as a
positive identity with the same dramatic focus as the negative identity.
Rather, this reframing focuses on the entirely different identity of
fatherhood. This can be illustrated by a simple minor subplot. In the
third episode of the second series, Sully sits down a famished Jason
over a pizza while inspecting the poor condition of the child’s teeth.
As he puts it: ‘My mum, all she cared about was fucking junk. Doesn’t
exactly set you up for life does it, having a mum like that. You have to
overcome all of that, trust me Jase . . . you have to make something of
this life even amongst all of this shit!’ In this exchange, Sully is both
educating Jason and berating ‘broken Britain’.
Lisa McKenzie (2015: 100) has discussed the absence of context
within media representations of Britain’s working classes, arguing that
such strategies chime with the discourse of ‘the underclass and their
lack of common societal values and morality, and their wilful self-
destruction and self-destructive behaviour’. Top Boy’s socio-political
message, which is delivered via the sentimental emphasis on Jason’s
emotional and physical suffering, is supported by a sense that none
of the problems depicted in the series – economic inequality, crime,
drugs, the youth, poverty and hunger – have socio-political causes.
This subplot demonstrates how Bennett has subtracted the socio-
political influences from the decisions made by his newly created
white working-class characters: Jason’s family’s obvious problems are
disconnected from the very social policy Bennett is proposing to
critique. Thus, as in the first series, Top Boy is not anchored in
any tangible socio-political realism but requires that the audience
adopt a moral position based on the understanding of the characters’
behaviour and motivation. As a result, we uncover through a series
of clichés a narrative conflict between the cinematic realism of van
Tulleken’s visualisation of Hackney and the inauthenticity of Bennett’s
dramaturgy. Thus the problems are self-inflicted: this is the sole
conclusion that can be drawn when the environment’s relationship with
the broader social context is extracted. At the very least, Top Boy offers
no socio-political position from which to view either Dushane or his
young disciples, and instead performs a moral critique of an immoral
social landscape.
The liberalism of the broadsheet press provides a telling
framework for understanding these representations. In the Observer,
30 October 2011, the first series was praised for ‘giving daring and
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ground-breaking work a platform to shed light on pressing issues from
an informed perspective’. The reluctance of cultural commentators
thoroughly to interrogate BAME representations remains a key issue
in cultural commentary, in which aesthetic and critical judgements
typically become muddled. In short, Top Boy is constructed by these
hegemonic approaches to the representation of race and class. Such
approaches, as we have argued in this article, show an inability to
weave any social commentary imperative into an effective narrative
strategy. This, in turn, produces a text that is unable to provide a form
of representation that distinguishes between, on the one hand, urban
crime as a matter of individual failings, and, on the other, as a socio-
political consequence of factors beyond individual control.
Of course, Top Boy does and should show that oppressed groups
possess moral failings like anyone else, but this does not override the
stereotypical black identities with which it operates. For Top Boy, the
representational schemas do not reside outside mainstream discourse
but can be seen as being embedded in the very discourses they claim
to challenge. Therefore the identity conferred by such representational
strategies colludes with dominant trends of media representations that
affirm liberal, middle-class anxieties that produce both fascination
and fear. The critical responses in the liberal press to the series
demonstrate how this form of decontextualised representation can
easily be appropriated by reactionary discourses that subsequently
serve to fuel myths: in this case, Hackney as a remote but dangerous
place where ‘black’ and ‘crime’ appear as almost synonymous.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the very concept of PSB has changed
in a way that has affected Channel 4 and how it interprets its remit,
not least with regard to multiculturalism, which itself has undergone
changes in the wider society. This industrial context is therefore
critical to the analysis of Top Boy and reaffirms that such dramas
are never organic but are determined by a range of interwoven
political, economic, industrial and cultural forces at the time of their
production. Public service broadcasters, it is suggested, have assumed
that culturally verisimilitudinous elements (rather than social realist
ones) guarantee audience appeal and expectations. Therefore, the
commercialisation of Channel 4 and a broader post-multicultural
agenda have performed a gradual but no less decisive role in
disarticulating the socio-political narratives that have arisen within
the recent context of PSB. In other words, post-multiculturalism has
also combined with neoliberalism at an economic level – shifting away
from economic discourses of inequality and social division towards
culturally based discourses around inclusion. This in turn has resulted
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in the dwindling of more authentic televisual practices on Channel 4
and instead has provided a visual hotline to the social anxieties and
grievances of the present day.
Conclusion
The major concern of this article has been to consider, through an
analysis of Top Boy, the rise and allure of the black urban crime
narrative, best understood against the vexed backdrops of post-
multiculturalism and PSB. The critical responses to Top Boy in the
liberal press highlight the complicit cultural relationship between
different aspects of the media in constructing ideas of criminality
through understandings of racial difference. The article has explored
how such narratives come to be internalised and reified by creative
producers and public service broadcasters in order to uphold the
liberal and ‘realistic’ credentials of the black urban crime drama on
television and, in turn, to reframe wider public understandings of
black masculinity. Various overlapping circumstances have helped to
produce a genre that is strongly dependent on notions of authenticity
and realism but which actually lacks a rigorous positioning of the lived
contexts in which criminal activity has taken place. Top Boy exemplifies
a post-multiculturalist shift away from addressing issues of inequality
and towards a suitably packaged commodification of urban culture
couched in the language of diversity and authenticity and articulated
through the tools of social realism. The conception, production and
reception of Top Boy all converge around these different cultural,
industrial and commercial currents.
We conclude by outlining how Top Boy highlights three critical
imperatives in relation to the black urban crime genre. Firstly, the
genre is both temporal and cyclical: its presence is aligned with broader
media narratives and a complex combination of cultural, political
and industrial conventions. Second, the genre cannot be seen simply
as the product of any single author’s vision, but as having been
brought into being through a number of cultural dynamics. Third, the
black urban crime drama should not be conflated with socio-political
drama. While we have argued that the dramatisation of the media
discourse of black criminality and its hybrid verisimilitude produce
an allure for the spectator, it might also be contended that Top Boy’s
critical success is the result of the drama’s rejection of a definite
political position (and thus embodying a perfectly post-multiculturalist
cultural product). As Galen Wilson (2014: 71) notes in his discussion
of HBO’s The Wire: ‘Realism, if uncritical, can become poverty porn
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at best, another means of controlling the underclass at worst; in both
cases realism’s revolutionary potential will be safely contained by the
system.’
For all the series’ generic verisimilitude, the absence of socio-
economic realities produces a text easily consumable by an audience’s
fascination with the ‘other’. The crossover imperative that has
characterised the genre compromises any socio-political imperatives
that the practitioner may wish to communicate, therefore challenging
our understandings of social realism. Instead, they emerge through
modes of realism that reduce the characters to peculiar objects for
the benefit of middle-class, liberal observers. In this respect, Top Boy
is archetypal UK urban drama in every way that we now conceive
of the genre, indicative of a further incremental step away from
‘black’ as a political term to, paradoxically, a commoditised product
within the framework of a post-multicultural PSB imperative (Malik
2013). This article has posed questions not only about what constitutes
an urban drama, but whether post-multicultural television drama,
however defined, can articulate counter-hegemonic perspectives and
present an authentic image of our socio-political realities, including
those that relate to crime and black Britain.
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